The COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented strain on hospitals and, in particular, critical care settings. Early in the pandemic, multiple plans were developed to ration ventilators in anticipatio...

_The Futures of School Reform_ represents the culminating work of a three-year discussion among national education leaders convened by the Harvard Graduate School of Education. Based on the recognition that current education reform efforts have reached their limits, the volume maps out a variety of bold visions that push the boundaries of our current thinking. Taken together, these visions identify the leverage points for generating dramatic change and highlight critical trade-offs among different courses of action. The goal of this book (...) is not to present a menu of options. Rather, it is to surface contrasting assumptions, tensions, constraints, and opportunities, so that together we can better understand—and act on—the choices that lie before us. (shrink)

John Gray argues that the doctrine of value pluralism poses a serious challenge for liberalisms of the Rawlsian and Millian kind. The only proper political doctrine that is compatible with value pluralism is a modus vivendi that can take various forms. But in truth, value pluralism does little to diminish the appeal of liberalism. Under modern conditions, any half‐decent modus vivendi will look more like liberalism than Gray supposes.

Just as values are like beacons for an individual, so they are for a profession, especially for HRD—a value–based management profession. Given the sweeping changes taking place in the business environment, it is plausible that the value orientation of HRD professionals have also changed. In an attempt to understand this, the study being presented here identified 11 value orientations, with ethico–moral, customer and quality orientations the three top ranking value orientations of HRD professionals. The study also discusses respondents’ rating of (...) their organization on the encouragement provided to employees in their job to practice the values they consider as the ones guiding their professional life. It concludes that though: (a) professionals still value strong humanistically–oriented values, business–oriented values seem to have taken priority over the same; (b) organizations encourage practice of all the 11 value orientations, they have come a long way from the traditional welfare approach or paternalistic attitude. (shrink)

This searching examination of the life and philosophy of the twentieth-century Indian intellectual Jarava Lal Mehta details, among other things, his engagement with the oeuvres of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jacques Derrida. It shows how Mehta’s sense of cross-cultural philosophy and religious thought were affected by these engagements, and maps the two key contributions Mehta made to the sum of human ideas. First, Mehta outlined what the author dubs a ‘postcolonial hermeneutics’ that uses the ‘ethnotrope’ (...) of the pilgrim to challenge the philosophical hermeneutic emphasis on supplementation and augmentation. For Mehta, the hermeneutic encounter ruptures, rather than supplements, the self. Secondly, Mehta extended this concept of hermeneutics to interrogate the Hindu tradition, arriving at the concept of the ‘negative messianic’. In contrast to Derrida's emphasis on the 'one to come', Mehta shows how the Hindu bhakti model represents the very opposite, that is, the 'withdrawn other,' identifying thereby the ethical pitfalls of deconstructivism's emphasis on the messianic tradition. This is the only full-length study in English of this high-profile Hindu philosopher. (shrink)

Lang, B. Philosophy and the manners of art.--Hofstadter, A. Freedom, enownment, and philosophy.--Mehta, J. L. A stranger from Asia.--Fox, D. A. A passage past India.--Rucker, D. Philosophy and the constitution of Emerson's world.--Schneider, H. W. The pragmatic movement in historical perspective.--Barnes, H. E. Reflections on myth and magic.--Cauvel, J. The imperious presence of theater.--Seay, A. Musical conservatism in the fourteenth century.--Hochman, W. R. The enduring fascination of war.--Davenport, M. M. J. Glenn Gray and the promise of wisdom.

We investigate model theoretic characterisations of the expressive power of modal logics in terms of bisimulation invariance. The paradigmatic result of this kind is van Benthem’s theorem, which says that a first-order formula is invariant under bisimulation if, and only if, it is equivalent to a formula of basic modal logic. The present investigation primarily concerns ramifications for specific classes of structures. We study in particular model classes defined through conditions on the underlying frames, with a focus on frame classes (...) that play a major role in modal correspondence theory and often correspond to typical application domains of modal logics. Classical model theoretic arguments do not apply to many of the most interesting classes–for instance, rooted frames, finite rooted frames, finite transitive frames, well-founded transitive frames, finite equivalence frames–as these are not elementary. Instead we develop and extend the game-based analysis over such classes and provide bisimulation preserving model constructions within these classes. Over most of the classes considered, we obtain finite model theory analogues of the classically expected characterisations, with new proofs also for the classical setting. The class of transitive frames is a notable exception, with a marked difference between the classical and the finite model theory of bisimulation invariant first-order properties. Over the class of all finite transitive frames in particular, we find that monadic second-order logic is no more expressive than first-order as far as bisimulation invariant properties are concerned — though both are more expressive here than basic modal logic. We obtain ramifications of the de Jongh–Sambin theorem and a new and specific analogue of the Janin–Walukiewicz characterisation of bisimulation invariant monadic second-order for finite transitive frames. (shrink)

On many occasions, individuals are able to coordinate their actions. The first empirical evidence to this effect has been described by Schelling (1960) in an informal experiment. His results were corroborated many years later by Mehta et al. (1994a,b) and Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997). From the point of view of mainstream game theory, the success of individuals in coordinating their actions is something of a mystery. If there are two or more strict Nash equilibria, mainstream game theory has no (...) means of explaining why people tend to choose their part of one and the same equilibrium. Textbooks (see, e.g., Rasmusen, 1989 and Kreps, 1990) refer to the fact that players may use focal points (see Schelling (1960)) or social conventions (see Lewis (1969)). Both notions cannot easily be incorporated into mainstream game theory, however. The notion of social conventions has recently been extensively studied in the context of evolutionary game theory where a population of agents interacts with each other. The central focus of this paper, however, is on situations where a few players play a game only once and I study how they may coordinate their actions. (shrink)

Venkataramanaiah, V. Introduction.--Narla, V. R. Russell and his rejection of religion.--Mehta, G. L. The sceptical crusader.--Dalvi, G. R. Russell, the man.--Venkatarao, V. The nuclear war and the future of man.--Innaiah, N. Bertrand Russell's philosophy.--Subbarayudu, P. Rationality vis-a-vis faith.--Nageswar Rao, B. Russell and nuclear warfare.--Rajagopala Rao, M. Rebel in Russell.--Shankar, G. N. J. The man who revolutionised modern thought.--Maharajasri. Russell, the social scientist in the four-dimensional universe.--The life of Bertrand Russell.--Acknowledgements.--A list of principal works of Bertrand Russell.--Russell's conception of good (...) society in a democratic socialist order.--Objects. (shrink)

Two algebraic structures, the contrapositionally complemented Heyting algebra (ccHa) and the contrapositionally |$\vee $| complemented Heyting algebra (c|$\vee $|cHa), are studied. The salient feature of these algebras is that there are two negations, one intuitionistic and another minimal in nature, along with a condition connecting the two operators. Properties of these algebras are discussed, examples are given and comparisons are made with relevant algebras. Intuitionistic Logic with Minimal Negation (ILM) corresponding to ccHas and its extension |${\textrm {ILM}}$|-|${\vee }$| for c|$\vee (...) $|cHas are then investigated. Besides its relations with intuitionistic and minimal logics, ILM is observed to be related to Peirce’s logic and Vakarelov’s logic MIN. With a focus on properties of the two negations, relational semantics for ILM and |${\textrm {ILM}}$|-|${\vee }$| are obtained with respect to four classes of frames, and inter-translations between the classes preserving truth and validity are provided. ILM and |${\textrm {ILM}}$|-|${\vee }$| are shown to have the finite model property with respect to these classes of frames and proved to be decidable. Extracting features of the two negations in the algebras, a further investigation is made, following logical studies of negations that define the operators independently of the binary operator of implication. Using Dunn’s logical framework for the purpose, two logics |$K_{im}$| and |$K_{im-{\vee }}$| are discussed, where the language does not include implication. The |$K_{im}$|-algebras are reducts of ccHas and are different from relevant algebraic structures having two negations. The negations in the |$K_{im}$|-algebras and |$K_{im-{\vee }}$|-algebras are shown to occupy distinct positions in an enhanced form of Dunn’s kite of negations. Relational semantics for |$K_{im}$| and |$K_{im-{\vee }}$| is provided by a class of frames that are based on Dunn’s compatibility frames. It is observed that this class coincides with one of the four classes giving the relational semantics for ILM and |${\textrm {ILM}}$|-|${\vee }$|⁠. (shrink)

This book presents a selection of essays by the Indian philosopher J.L. Mehta on the topics of hermeneutics and phenomenology containing many original ...

We consider fixed point logics, i.e., extensions of first order predicate logic with operators defining fixed points. A number of such operators, generalizing inductive definitions, have been studied in the context of finite model theory, including nondeterministic and alternating operators. We review results established in finite model theory, and also consider the expressive power of the resulting logics on infinite structures. In particular, we establish the relationship between inflationary and nondeterministic fixed point logics and second order logic, and we consider (...) questions related to the determinacy of games associated with alternating fixed points. (shrink)

We consider Choiceless Polynomial Time , a language introduced by Blass, Gurevich and Shelah, and show that it can express a query originally constructed by Cai, Fürer and Immerman to separate fixed-point logic with counting from image. This settles a question posed by Blass et al. The program we present uses sets of unbounded finite rank: we demonstrate that this is necessary by showing that the query cannot be computed by any program that has a constant bound on the rank (...) of sets used, even in image, an extension of image with counting. (shrink)

We identify complete fragments of the simple theory of types with infinity and Quine’s new foundations set theory. We show that TSTI decides every sentence ϕ in the language of type theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s1⋯∃ylslθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables, s1>⋯>sl, and θ is quantifier-free, ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s⋯∃ylsθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables and θ is quantifier-free. This shows that NF decides every stratified sentence ϕ in the language (...) of set theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns distinct values to all of the variables y1,…,yl, ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns the same value to all of the variables y1,…,yl. (shrink)

We consider the problem of obtaining logical characterisations of oracle complexity classes. In particular, we consider the complexity classes LOGSPACENP and PTIMENP. For these classes, characterisations are known in terms of NP computable Lindström quantifiers which hold on ordered structures. We show that these characterisations are unlikely to extend to arbitrary structures, since this would imply the collapse of certain exponential complexity hierarchies. We also observe, however, that PTIMENP can be characterised in terms of Lindström quantifers , though it remains (...) open whether this can be done for LOGSPACENP. (shrink)

This note investigates the class of finite initial segments of the cumulative hierarchy of pure sets. We show that this class is first-order definable over the class of finite directed graphs and that this class admits a first-order definable global linear order. We apply this last result to show that FO = FO.

A Theory of Magnitude suggests that space, time, and quantities are processed through a generalized magnitude system. ATOM posits that task-irrelevant magnitudes interfere with the processing of task-relevant magnitudes as all the magnitudes are processed by a common system. Many behavioral and neuroimaging studies have found support in favor of a common magnitude processing system. However, it is largely unknown whether such cross-domain monotonic mapping arises from a change in the accuracy of the magnitude judgments or results from changes in (...) precision of the processing of magnitude. Therefore, in the present study, we examined whether large numerical magnitude affects temporal accuracy or temporal precision, or both. In other words, whether numerical magnitudes change our temporal experience or simply bias duration judgments. The temporal discrimination paradigm was used to present numerical magnitudes across varied durations. We estimated temporal accuracy and precision for each numerical magnitude. The results revealed that temporal accuracy for large numerical magnitude was significantly lower than that of small and identical magnitudes. This implies that the temporal duration was overestimated for large numerical magnitude compared to small and identical numerical magnitude, in line with ATOM’s prediction. However, no influence of numerical magnitude was observed on temporal precision. The findings of the present study suggest that task-irrelevant numerical magnitude selectively affects the accuracy of processing of duration but not duration discrimination itself. Further, we argue that numerical magnitude may not directly affect temporal processing but could influence via attentional mechanisms. (shrink)

Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic: they assume that to consciously perceive is to deploy only one kind of sensory awareness. Here I instead argue for rich pluralism, which says that to consciously perceive is to deploy two very different kinds of sensory awareness in concert: representational awareness of particulars, and non-representational, partly essence-revealing awareness of sensory qualities.

Consider two deeply appealing thoughts: first, that we experience external particulars, and second, that what it’s like to have an experience – the phenomenal character of an experience – is somehow independent of external particulars. The first thought is readily captured by phenomenal particularism, the view that external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. The second thought is readily captured by phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character. -/- Here I (...) show that a novel version of phenomenal generalism can capture both thoughts in a satisfying fashion. Along the way, I reveal severe problems facing phenomenal particularism and also shed light on the mental kinds under which experiences fall. (shrink)

Shedding light on a fundamental tension in liberal theory, Liberalism and Empire reaches beyond post-colonial studies to revise our conception of the grand liberal tradition and the conception of experience with which it is associated.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 209-231, January 2022.

Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge-centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental (...) epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge-centered accounts. (shrink)

According to phenomenal particularism, external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. Mehta criticizes this view, and French and Gomes :451–460, 2016) have attempted to show that phenomenal particularists have the resources to respond to Mehta’s criticisms. We argue that French and Gomes have failed to appreciate the force of Mehta’s original arguments. When properly interpreted, Mehta’s arguments provide a strong case in favor of phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never (...) part of phenomenal character. (shrink)

What grounds facts of the form? One promising answer is: facts of the form. A different promising answer is: x itself. Isaac Wilhelm has recently argued that the second answer is superior to the first. In this paper, I rebut his argument.

It can seem incoherent to fully characterize fundamentality in terms of grounding, given that the fundamental is precisely that which cannot be fully characterized independently. I argue that there is no such incoherence.

What I require is a convening of my culture's criteria, in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may pursue them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture's words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along the lines it meets in me. Stanley Cavell.

We sketch out two basic paradigms informing banking practice: the economistic paradigm focusing on profit maximization and the humanistic one, serving the common good. We then highlight paradigmatic cases to explore how each of these business models fared during the quasi-natural experiment of the financial crisis. We find that many humanistic banks outperformed traditional economistic banks. Despite the uneven playing field humanistic banks fared remarkably well with regard to traditional financial performance judgements, muting criticisms of competitiveness. We find that overall (...) both paradigms can provide a basis for successful banking as long as social and financial value generation are blended. We conclude by providing lessons learned for better banking. (shrink)

Naïve realism is a theory of perception with great explanatory ambitions. It has been influentially argued that, in order to realize these explanatory ambitions, the naïve realist should say that any perception belongs to just one fundamental kind. I think, however, that adopting this commitment does not particularly help the naïve realist to realize her explanatory ambitions, and so is not warranted. This result is significant because once this commitment about fundamental kinds is relinquished, we see that it is possible (...) to develop some new and surprising forms of naïve realism—most notably, what I call pluralist naïve realism. (shrink)

I assume that there exists a general phenomenon, the phenomenon of the explanatory gap, surrounding consciousness, normativity, intentionality, and more. Explanatory gaps are often thought to foreclose reductive possibilities wherever they appear. In response, reductivists who grant the existence of these gaps have offered countless local solutions. But typically such reductivist responses have had a serious shortcoming: because they appeal to essentially domain-specific features, they cannot be fully generalized, and in this sense these responses have been not just local but (...) parochial. Here I do better. Taking for granted that the explanatory gap is a genuine phenomenon, I offer a fully general diagnosis that unifies these previously fragmented reductivist responses. (shrink)

In this paper, I advance a new hypothesis about what the ordinary concept of perceptual experience might be. To a first approximation, my hypothesis is that it is the concept of something that seems to present mind-independent objects. Along the way, I reveal two important errors in Michael Martin’s argument for the very different view that the ordinary concept of perceptual experience is the concept of something that is impersonally introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. This conceptual work is significant (...) because it provides three pieces of good news for the common kind theorist. (shrink)

Using Canada as a case study, this article argues that regulating biotechnology and nanotechnology is made unnecessarily complex and inherently unstable because of a failure to consult the public early and of-ten enough. Furthermore, it is argued that future regulators (and promoters) of nanotechnology may learn valuable lessons from the mistakes made in regulating biotechnology.

In his 2009 article “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,” Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel’s argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel’s argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel’s argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are accompanied by (...) peripheral awareness of those very experiences to the claim that all experiences are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences. This inference is inadequately defended, for the explanandum may also be given a straightforward evolutionary explanation. Second, contra Kriegel, I argue that phenomenological investigation does not support the thesis that we are always peripherally aware of our experiences. Instead, it delivers no verdict on this thesis. Kriegel’s phenomenological mistake may be explained via a highly diluted version of the famous transparency thesis about experience. (shrink)

Pure insight, however is in the first instance without any content; it is the sheer disappearance of content; but by its negative attitude towards what it excludes it will make itself real and give itself a content.—Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind.

Sociologists of science and others have long been interested in how advances in science come about, and their potential social and economic impacts. Developments in nanoscience and nanotechnology will provide social scientists with a unique opportunity to explore how scientific activities form de novo. Additionally, scientists will have the opportunity to examine the factors that drive science and technology in certain directions by considering how different models of innovation may explain how the topography of the knowledge-based economy is being shaped (...) by radically new approaches to science. (shrink)

I highlight a neglected but striking phenomenological fact about our experiences: they have a pervasively spatial character. Specifically, all (or almost all) phenomenal qualities – roughly, the introspectible, philosophically puzzling properties that constitute ‘what it’s like’ to have an experience – introspectively seem instantiated in some kind of space. So, assuming a very weak charity principle about introspection, some phenomenal qualities are instantiated in space. But there is only one kind of space – the ordinary space occupied by familiar objects. (...) And the only objects appropriately located in ordinary space are outside the subject’s mind. This entails experiential externalism, the view that at least one phenomenal quality is instantiated outside the subject’s mind. Experiential externalism is incompatible with many leading theories of experience, including certain mental paint theories; some forms of representationalism; paradigmatic versions of sense-datum theory; and views on which no phenomenal qualities are instantiated. My argument is structurally similar to familiar arguments based on the ‘transparency of experience.’ However, I suggest, phenomenological intuitions about spatiality are considerably more stable than phenomenological intuitions about transparency. For many philosophers, transparency intuitions fade markedly with respect to non-standard experiences, including experiences associated with blurry or double vision. But spatiality intuitions remain robust even for these experiences. Thus, spatiality intuitions should be more dialectically effective than transparency intuitions for supporting experiential externalism. (shrink)